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The limits of forecasting methods in anticipating rare events 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we review methods that aim to aid the anticipation of rare, high-impact, events. We 
evaluate these methods according to their ability to yield well-calibrated probabilities or point 
forecasts for such events. We first identify six factors that can lead to poor calibration  and then 
examine how successful the methods are in mitigating these factors. We demonstrate that all the 
extant forecasting methods - including the use of expert judgment, statistical forecasting, Delphi and 
prediction markets - contain fundamental weaknesses. We contrast these methods with a non-
forecasting method that is intended to aid planning for the future – scenario planning. We conclude 
that all the methods are problematic for aiding the anticipation of rare events and that the only 
remedies are to either (i) to provide protection for the organization against the occurrence of 
negatively-valenced events whilst allowing the organization to benefit from the occurrence of 
positively-valenced events, or (ii) to provide conditions to challenge one‟s own thinking – and hence 
improve anticipation. We outline how use of components of devil‟s advocacy and dialectical inquiry 
can be combined with Delphi and scenario planning to enhance anticipation of rare events.
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Introduction: What do we mean by predictability? 
It is not hard to identify events  that  have a large impact on the lives of many people, but which 
were unexpected by most people. Some of these events are natural disasters and some have human 
causes. Consider the global financial melt-down of 2008 . Once such an event occurs it often seems 
to have been inevitable, with hindsight. Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba [1] quote many examples of 
publicly-available forecasts made by key figures in finance and economics just before the global 
financial crisis of 2008. These before-event forecasts can now be seen to have been completely 
wrong.  Consider, also, newspaper coverage of terrorist attacks in the US homeland. Such coverage 
was mute before the 9/11 attacks but, post-event, analysis of the causes took many column-inches. 
How good are (i) human judgment and (ii) statistical forecasting at anticipating the occurrence of 
such events? Can techniques that incorporate human judgment in a structured way improve 
anticipation over and above holistic judgement? This paper analyses these issues and seeks to 
identify the limitations on our ability to accurately anticipate the occurrence of rare, high-impact, 
events. We also consider what the implications of these limitations are for organisational planning.  
 
The nature of predictability 
 
Assume that all forecasts can ultimately be represented as an objective or subjective probability 
distribution. We may, of course, only report the forecast in terms of the event we consider most 
probable (e.g. “I forecast that a Democrat will win in 2012”) or as a measure of   central tendency of 
the distribution, such as the mean (e.g. “The expected level of demand next year is 2500 units”) .  
Also, we are excluding forecasts that may be expressed in fuzzy terms (e.g. “I think that there‟s a 
good chance that the economy will perform well”). Based on this assumption, Wright and Goodwin 
[2] argue that the term, predictability, can be interpreted on two levels. First, predictability can relate 
to the capability of forecasters to  produce a well-calibrated probability distribution. Perfect 
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calibration would be achieved, for example, if it rains on 10% of days when we have said that the 
probability of rain is 10%.  If it rains on more, or less, than 10% of those days then our probability 
assessment is mis-calibrated – i.e., we may be over-confident or under-confident in our assessment  . 
Similarly, if our forecast is simply reported as the mean of the distribution, we would expect the 
mean outcome in the future to be close to this value if our forecast is well-calibrated. Of course, 
when forecasts are made relatively infrequently we may not able to measure calibration.  
 
Alternatively,  even if forecasts are made frequently, we are by definition unlikely to be able to 
collect much data for occasions when rare events occur; so measuring our capability of  assigning 
appropriate probabilities to such event will be problematical. Nevertheless,  the concept is still useful 
as a criterion for explaining what we mean by poor quality, or high-quality, forecasts. Note than 
when we use the term predictability in this sense we are referring to the capability of carrying out the 
prediction task in a valid way. Such predictability can be high even when there are a large number of 
possible events that can occur, each with a low probability of occurrence, as long as our estimates of 
these probabilities are well-calibrated. In  a draw in the UK national lottery  one of 13,983,816 
different sets of number can be selected. However, such events are predictable, in this first sense, 
because we can determine a perfectly calibrated probability  for each set. 
 
Second, predictability can be interpreted as relating  to the dispersion of the probability distribution – 
the more dispersed this is then the higher will be the expected error associated with a particular 
quantitative point forecast or, if the forecast is expressed as a statement that a particular event will 
occur, the lower will be the probability that the statement will be correct. For example, by this, 
second, definition of predictability, if the future demand for a product is approximately normally 
distributed with a standard deviation of 250 units, then the outcome of future demand will be more 
predictable than if the standard deviation had been 500 units. Thus, in this second sense, the 
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predictability of sets of numbers in the UK national lottery is low. If you predict that a given set of 
numbers will be drawn then you only have a 1/13,983,816  probability of being correct. 
 
Wright and Goodwin [2] argue that if well-calibrated probabilities can be obtained, decision theory 
can be used to make rational decisions on the basis of them, even if the predictability (in the second 
sense) is low  [3].  If we have a reliable probability estimate for the occurrence of  an earthquake in a 
particular county in the next ten years we can use a rational process to assign an appropriate level of 
resources in anticipation of that event, even if this probability is very low. If we do not have a 
reliable estimate then we may assign an inappropriate level of resources. It is therefore the first form 
of predictability – the ability to establish well calibrated forecasts - that is the topic of this paper 
(hereafter we will use the term in this sense only). While our prime interest is in events that have the 
potential to have a major impact it should be noted that the probability of these events is not 
necessarily low – the probability of an important event may actually be quite high, we may simply 
have not recognised this.   We will first examine the potential reasons why predictability in a given 
situation may be low. Then we will compare the effectiveness of methods that are designed either to 
improve predictability - or to allow for effective planning when predictability cannot be improved. 
We then consider the implications for planning in organizations. 
 
 
Six causes of low predictability 
Sparsity of  reference class 
Predictability will be greater when we have data on a large set of similar events (i.e., a large 
reference class) from which relative frequency information can be obtained. This will be the case 
when events are defined more generally - the greater the specificity of the definition, the smaller will 
be its reference class. The number of terrorist attacks of any kind in the world in the course of a year 
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is therefore more predictable than the number of terrorist kidnappings occurring in the course of a 
week.  Large reference classes are akin to larger samples of a population – they allow us to make 
more reliable assessments of the underlying probability distribution. Large reference classes also 
lend themselves to statistical analysis, so that judgmental biases can be avoided in the estimation 
task. Thus for some events,  like the number of earthquakes or hurricanes that might occur in the 
world in the course of a year, it is possible to establish relative-frequency-based, objective, 
probabilities and these probabilities are likely to be well-calibrated. In contrast, novel events, for 
which there are no past analogies, such as the ”the Gulf stream will stop flowing  within twenty 
years” are likely to be highly unpredictable. 
 
Reference class is outdated or does not contain extreme events 
Reference classes are bound to be biased samples of potential events because they sample – and they 
sample only the past and not the future.  This will be a problem when systems that impact on the 
occurrence of those events are subject to fundamental changes. Reference classes are also likely to 
be biased because very rare events with potentially massive impacts are, by definition, unlikely to be 
included in the sampling - so that their probabilities of occurrence (or even possibilities) are 
discounted due to sampling bias. The use of a reference class can, therefore lead to poorly-calibrated 
forecasts for the occurrence of rare, high impact, events. 
 
Use of inappropriate statistical models 
Even when a reference class is rich in data, there is a danger that poorly-calibrated forecasts may be 
obtained - because of erroneous assumptions and the use of an inappropriate probability distribution. 
This may occur when people view mistakenly review the reference class as being a reliable sample 
of possible events and ignore the issues mentioned above. For example, Taleb [4] reports that 
financial models often assume that changes in stock prices follow a normal distribution yet, the stock 
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market crash of Black Monday represented a fall of  20 standard deviations from the mean and 
hence, if the normal distribution assumption is true,  should only have occurred once in  „every 
several billion lifetimes of the universe‟ [4]. 
 
Models are also bound to be simplifications of real systems and may not fully account for complex 
interactions between elements of these systems. This is likely to be true of models of the economy, 
weather systems or the human body  [5]. The effect of minor changes in one part of the system or in 
initial conditions can be amplified through these interactions. Thus the range of uncertainty indicated 
by the  model may under estimate  the true range so that the generated probabilities are poorly 
calibrated. Drawing analogies from systems biology, Orrel and McSharry [5] have suggested that 
using a single model to capture the behaviour of these complex systems is inappropriate and that 
what is needed is the use of different approaches to model different aspects of systems. These 
multiple approaches will require the collaboration of experts in different fields. However, these 
suggestions have, as yet, been untested in areas such as climate, economic or political forecasting 
and the authors themselves appear to have some doubts about their likely success when they argue 
that “instead of trying to predict the future, [perhaps] we should use models to better understand a 
system‟s behaviour.” 
 
 
The Danger of Misplaced Causality 
Most models will be based on the assumption about the causal relationships between variables. 
However, a coherent theory of causality, which provides a good fit to data in the reference class and 
which may have the support of a broad consensus of experts in the relevant field,  does not establish 
that the causality exists. For example, there is a strong correlation between carbon dioxide emissions 
and global temperatures and a coherent theory to explain this linkage which has received widespread 
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scientific support. However, this has not prevented challenges to this theory of the cause of global 
warming.  Correlations may be spurious (e.g. they may result from hidden third factors),  or they 
may only apply in the conditions that are relevant to the reference class data . Moreover, when 
human judgment is involved (see below), correlations may be illusory [6] with preconceived 
correlations being confirmed in the judge‟s mind by the selective recall of instances that accord with 
the belief in the correlation. The fallacy that a high correlation necessarily implies causation is 
widely encountered and can be a powerful influence of people‟s reasoning. 
 
Cognitive biases 
When the reference class contains insufficient cases for statistical estimation, human judgment is  
often used to estimate the probabilities of  events occurring.   Much of the research on the quality of 
human judgment of probability has stemmed from the work of Tversky and Kahneman  [7] who 
argued that people use simple mental strategies or heuristics to cope with the complexities of 
estimating probabilities. While these heuristics can sometimes provide good estimates and reduce 
the effort required by the decision maker, they can also lead to systematically biased judgments. The 
three main heuristics identified are: 
i) Availability.  Here, events within the reference class which are vivid, recent, unusual or 
highlighted by the media are readily recalled or envisaged and therefore assigned high probabilities. 
Availability can be a reliable heuristic since frequently occurring events are usually easier to recall 
so the higher probabilities estimated for them should  be reliable. However, the ease with which an 
event can be recalled or imagined sometimes has no relationship to the true probability of the event 
occurring.  For example, some events are easily recalled precisely because they are unusual and rare. 
By contrast, events that have never occurred, or only occurred in the distant past, may be assigned a 
de-facto probability of zero, or near-zero. 
ii)  Representativeness. This heuristic describes a tendency to ignore base rates frequencies and was 
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demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman in a series of experiments where participants were asked to 
judge the probability that an individual had a particular occupation. Participants were given both 
base rate information and a low-quality, but stereotypical, description of the person. The finding was 
that valid base-rate information was ignored. This and related studies indicate that even when useful 
reference class information is salient for utilisation in forecasting  it will be ignored in favour of 
ephemeral, low-validity, individuating information. Indeed, Kahneman and Lovallo [8]
 
have argued 
that people tend to see each individual forecasting problems as unique when it would best be thought 
of as example  of the  broader  reference class of events. Hence they  tend to pay particular attention 
to the distinguishing features of the problem in hand and reject analogies to other instances of the 
same general type as superficial. For example, Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberger
 
 [9] found that 
entrepreneurs who were interviewed about their chances of business success produced assessments 
that were unrelated to objective predictors such as college education, prior supervisory experience 
and initial capital. Moreover, more than 80% of them described their chances of success as 70% or 
better while the overall survival rate for new businesses is as low as 33%.  
 
Gigerenzer  [10] argues that we are simply not equipped to reason about uncertainty by assessing 
subjective probabilities for unique events but that we can reason successfully about uncertainty with 
frequencies. For example, the entrepreneurs might have been asked instead: “What percentage of 
new businesses are successful?”. However,  obtaining relative-frequency-based assessments is not 
feasible for rare events because a reference class of previous forecasts or historic frequencies is not 
available. If human thinking is best expressed, and thought of, as that of frequency thinking rather 
than probabilistic thinking this conceptualization clearly does not help in the anticipation of high-
impact rare events. 
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iii)     Anchoring and insufficient adjustment.  Here, forecasts that are used in the decision process 
may be biased by forecasters anchoring on the current value and making insufficient adjustment for 
the effect of future conditions. Alternatively, there may be a tendency to anchor on the probability of 
single events when estimating the probability that a particular combination of events will occur. For 
example,  if an individual component of a system has a 0.9 probability of functioning perfectly over 
a given time scale this probability may unduly influence an estimate of the probability that all 100 
components of the system will function perfectly over the period in question.  
 
Frame blindness  
The  frame refers to how one views and structures a prediction problem. It involves determining 
what must be predicted, the form the prediction will take (e.g. point estimate or prediction interval), 
what factors are likely to impinge on the event that is to be predicted, the consequences of inaccurate 
prediction, the likely reliability of the prediction and the effort and resources that it is appropriate to 
devote to the prediction task. Since predictions are made to inform decisions the prediction frame 
will be closely aligned with the way that the corresponding decision has been framed. Frames are 
bound to be simplifications of real problems and each of them will only give a partial view of a 
prediction problem. For example, different frames will emphasise different potential influences on 
the event that is being predicted or they may attach different degrees of importance to the potential 
errors associated with the prediction, Difficulties can arise when a single frame is used 
unquestionably by forecasters, perhaps because of habit or professional specialism. Managers‟ 
mental models of the world, exemplified by the use of a single frame, are analogous to single visual 
perspectives on a scene. One viewpoint through a window frame may mean that only part of the 
external world is in view while another observer, looking through a different window frame, may see 
more (or less) of the external environment. Additionally, the past experience of the observer shapes 
his or her (mis)interpretation of events that occur.  
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In one study the variability between individual managers‟ mental models of competitive structures in 
the UK grocery retailing industry was examined [11]. Considerable variation was found in the nature 
and complexity of industry views from managers both within and between companies. This diversity 
was associated with the functional roles that individual managers held. Barr et al. [12] addressed the 
issue of why some organizations are able to realign their strategy with a changing environment, 
whilst others are not, offering a cognitive explanation for the lack of organizational renewal. They 
argued that „human (cognitive) frailties mean that managers‟ mental models of the competitive 
environment may be incomplete or inaccurate, and that these models „often fail to change in a timely 
manner in response to a changing environment‟ (p 17). At the same time, political pressures within 
the organization act to quell dissonant or „deviant‟ opinion, which recognize the true, paradigm-
threatening nature of the information (see also [13]). 
 
All of  this indicates that habitual frames of reference may come to dominate thinking and changes 
in the world that may herald the occurrence of rare, high impact events may not be recognized as 
such. Consider, for example, the dramatic sub-prime mortgage crisis that started in the US. The 
causal factors behind the crisis now seem obvious, with hindsight. But these causes seem not to have 
been so obvious to the finance industry insiders, a-priori.  
 
Solutions? 
We next assess the extent to which these six causes of the low predictability of high-impact, rare 
events can mitigated by approaches that have been proposed either to improve the calibration of 
forecasts or to enable effective planning to take place when it is assumed that unpredictability cannot 
be reduced. Table 1 provides a summary of how well each of these methods is likely to impact on, or 
be impacted by, the six causes of unpredictability that we have just outlined. Some of the strengths 
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Table 1: How the methods relate to the sources of unpredictability 
Source of unpredictability 
Statistical 
forecasting 
Expert 
judgment 
Decomposed 
judgment 
Structured 
analogies 
Judgmental 
adjustment to 
statistical  
forecasts 
Delphi Prediction 
markets 
Scenario planning 
Sparsity of reference class Unreliable in 
these 
circumstances 
May outperform 
statistical methods in 
these circumstances 
May outperform 
statistical methods 
in these 
circumstances 
Supports best 
use of available 
cases in 
reference class 
May lead to 
improvements 
over statistical 
forecasts in these 
circumstances 
Addressed, in 
principle, by 
exchange of 
reasons 
May outperform 
statistical 
methods in 
these 
circumstances 
Analysis of causal  
interactions allows  
participant to see beyond  
existing reference class 
Inappropriate reference class Unreliable in 
these 
circumstances 
Expert  may focus on 
explaining current 
circumstances and 
lose the wider picture 
Unreliable if 
reference class is 
used 
Unreliable in 
these 
circumstances 
Unreliable if 
reference class is 
used 
Addressed, in 
principle, by 
exchange of 
reasons 
Fast response to 
new information  
may counter this 
problem 
Danger of anchoring 
 scenarios in current  
economic conditions and  
current media concerns 
Inappropriate statistical 
model 
Unreliable in 
these 
circumstances 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Mixed evidence 
on whether 
adjustments can 
compensate for  
model  
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Misplaced causality Model may 
embed false 
assumptions 
about causality 
Expert may focus on 
„pet theory‟ and 
defend its use with 
vigour 
Decomposition 
structure may 
emphasise false 
causality 
assumptions 
Selection of 
analogies may 
be predicated 
on false  causal 
assumptions 
Adjustments may 
reflect illusory 
correlations  
Reasons 
exchanged 
may reflect 
particular 
theories about 
causality 
which may be 
false  
Participants in 
the market may 
be influenced by 
the paradigm 
which is 
currently 
popular.  
Scenarios depend on beliefs 
 that particular causal 
 chains apply 
Cognitive biases Avoids 
problem for a 
given data set, 
but biases may 
apply in 
selection of 
data & method 
Experts are likely to 
suffer from cognitive 
biases 
Biases should be 
reduced by 
decomposition  
Biases in recall 
of similar cases 
should be 
reduced 
Unreliable in 
these 
circumstances, 
but structured 
methods may 
improve 
reliability 
Addressed, in 
principle, by 
dialectical 
nature of 
process and 
averaging of 
individual 
estimates 
Mitigated in 
part by 
aggregation of 
individual 
estimates 
Simulation heuristic may  
lead to inappropriate  
confidence that a detailed 
 scenario will unfold 
Frame blindness Not addressed Unlikely to be 
addressed by expert 
associated with a 
particular „school of 
thought‟ 
Not addressed. 
Structure of 
decomposition 
will be predicated 
on current frame  
Not addressed Not addressed Addressed, in 
part, by 
dialectical 
nature of 
process 
No mechanism 
inherent in the 
method for 
challenging  this 
May reinforce existing frame 
 unless „remarkable people‟ 
 are employed to challenge 
participants‟ frames of 
 reference 
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and limitations of these methods may also apply when the probabilties of frequently occurring 
methods are being assessed. However, in these circumstances there is more chance of  rapid and 
data-rich feedback on the accuracy of the forecasts so that errors and biases may be recognised and 
corrected more quickly.  
  
i) Statistical forecasting 
When there is a large reference class of relevant data, statistical forecasting has the advantage that 
this data can be handled completely and efficiently, thereby precluding the cognitive biases 
associated with human judgment (although, in economic forecasting, data series used in model 
building are often inaccurate and liable to be  revised, sometimes after significant delays). That said, 
there is nothing inherent in statistical forecasting to warn that the forecasting problem may have 
been inappropriately framed and that attention is being paid to forecasting the wrong phenomena. 
For example, we may focus our efforts on forecasting the behaviour of competitors in our industry or 
the effects of our marketing mix, when the real impact on our company‟s well being will come from 
new industries based on novel technologies.  Events sometimes have a high impact precisely because 
they represent a change from events contained in the reference class that is thought to be relevant.  
 
In addition, judgmental and motivational biases may apply in the choice of  forecasting method  and 
data. Changing conditions in an industry may mean that data on only the most recent members of the 
reference class are relevant. The longer the lead time of the forecast then the greater the danger that 
few, if any members, of the reference class will be useful. Alternatively, in the short term, there may 
be a tendency to fit models only to recent members because of over-reactions to events and 
perceptions of  changes that are really only noise [14].   
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Causality can also be problematical for statistical methods. Correlations between variables do not 
prove causality so the selection of independent variables needs to be based on some external theory 
of what is likely to account for variations in the dependent variables. However, such theories are 
themselves likely to have been informed or supported by the extent to which they fit past 
observations and they may be inapplicable to conditions that will apply in the future. 
 
Assumptions that forecasting errors are normally distributed may be tempting because they simplify 
the analysis and allow access to a well-established body of techniques. Such assumptions have been 
prevalent in portfolio analysis variance at risk (VaR) techniques [15]. However, these methods tend 
to underestimate the probability of extreme events when the „true‟ distribution is „fat-tailed‟. This is 
because most of the data used in fitting the model  is close to the central tendency of the distribution 
and data on extremes is by definition, rare. Extreme value theory has attempted to avoid this bias by 
concentrating analysis on the extremes and using distributions such as the generalised extreme value 
distribution (GEV). This has a tail index parameter which determines the thickness of a 
distribution‟s tail. However, extreme value theory still faces a number of challenges [15]. The small 
amount of data that is available on extremes has to be used to determine if the „true‟ distribution is 
indeed fat-tailed and to estimate the parameters of the distribution.  In addition, defining a threshold 
for what is deemed to be an extreme event, and hence should be included in the estimation process, 
can be problematical.  Lowering the threshold increases the number of observations available for 
estimating the tail index  so that the estimate is more  precise, but it is also likely to bring in 
observations that are closer to the central tendency so that the bias in the estimate is increased. 
 
The complete absence of extreme events, above a certain threshold, from the reference class means 
that they can only be forecast by extrapolation. Extrapolation involves the strong assumption that the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables remains the same beyond the observed 
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data set. For example, assumptions of linear relationships may not apply far beyond the observed 
data.  
 
 
ii) Expert judgment 
Statistical methods will be unreliable when membership of an appropriate class is sparse. In these 
cases recourse may be made to the use of experts‟ judgmental forecasts. Research on the quality of 
calibration performance of experts‟ probability assessments – usually with respect to forecasting 
performance - has been found, in several instances, to be very good; for example, [16] (financial 
interest rates); [17] (horse racing); [18]  (the card game, Bridge); and, most strikingly, in weather 
forecasting  [19].  Conversely, in several instances poor calibration has been found  -for example 
[20] (clinical psychologists) and  [21] (maize judges).  More recently, Tetlock  [22] collected 82,361 
political and economic forecasts from experts asking them to estimate probabilities for various 
events. They performed worse than chance 
 
Judgmental probability forecasts are routinely generated in weather forecasting.  Indeed, the official 
forecasts issued by the National Weather Service in the United States are subjective probability 
forecasts.  Murphy & Brown  [19] evaluated these subjective forecasts and found that, for certain 
categories of weather, they were more accurate than the available objective statistical techniques.  
The weather forecasters have a very large amount of information available, including the output 
from statistical techniques.  They also receive detailed feedback and have the opportunity to gain 
experience of making forecasts under a wide range of meteorological conditions.  Furthermore, they 
have considerable practice in quantifying their internal state of uncertainty.  These circumstances 
may well be ideal for the relatively successful application of judgmental as compared to purely 
quantitative forecasting.   
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More widely, Bolger & Wright  [23] and Rowe & Wright [24] have argued that in many real world 
tasks, apparent expertise (as indicated by, for example, status) may have little relationship to any real 
judgment skill at the task in question.  In Bolger and Wright‟s review of studies of expert judgmental 
performance they found that only six had showed “good” performance by experts, while nine had 
shown poor performance.  Bolger and Wright analysed and then interpreted this pattern of 
performance in terms of the “ecological validity” and “learnability” of the tasks that were posed to 
the experts.  By “ecological validity” is meant the degree to which the experts were required to make 
judgments inside the domain of their professional experience and/or express their judgments in 
familiar metrics.  By “learnability” is meant the degree to which it is possible for good judgment to 
be learned in the task domain.  That is, if objective data and models and/or reliable and usable 
feedback are unavailable, then it may not be possible for a judge in that domain to improve his or her 
performance significantly with experience.  In such cases, Bolger and Wright argued, the 
performance of novices and “experts” is likely to be equivalent and they concluded that expert 
performance will be largely a function of the interaction between the dimensions of ecological 
validity and learnability – if both are high then good performance will be manifest, but if one or both 
are low then performance will be poor.   
 
Wright et al., [26] studied expert life-underwriters and attempted to ensure that the expert-task match 
was as strong as possible (given experimental limitations), and that ecological validity was high, and 
yet still obtained expert performance that was not much better than lay person performance.  This 
result suggests that the underwriting task is not truly “learnable”, i.e.,it is not one for which there is 
regular feedback on the correctness or otherwise of judgments.  Indeed, in the training of 
underwriters, performance is assessed according to the similarity of junior underwriters‟ judgments 
to those of their seniors  [27].  Once “trained,” underwriters receive infrequent performance-related, 
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objective feedback about the correctness of their judgments, and indeed it would be difficult to 
provide such feedback, given that a “poor” judgment might turn out to be insuring an applicant who 
subsequently died of a condition after perhaps 20 years of a 25-year policy.  
 
As such, the tasks performed by other professional risk assessors may also be unlearnable.  For 
example, in the case of major hazards in the nuclear industry there may be no risk/judgment 
feedback at all and the calibration of expert judgment cannot be assumed.  Similarly, recall  
the validity of expert predictive judgments about the likelihood magnitude of human infection by 
“mad cow disease” resulting from eating beef from herds infected with Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) in the early 1990‟s and the subsequent, poorly predicted, mortality rates [25]. 
Here the fact that the event was novel and unique precluded the availability of feedback. We 
conclude that the common sense assumption of the veracity of expert judgment of the likelihood of 
rare, high-impact events is ill-founded.  The lack of a reference class of prediction-outcome data for 
such rare events means that experts cannot learn from feedback, over time. It follows that bias in 
expert judgment is, likely to be prevalent - since solely heuristic processes can be utilized by experts 
in the generation of forecasts. In addition, Tetlock  [22] found that the experts in his study were 
skilled at inventing excuses for the errors in their forecasts. (e.g. “I was almost right”, “my timing 
was just off” or “I made the right mistake”) This would further reduce any chance they had of 
learning from the very limited outcome feedback that they received. 
 
 
iii) Structured judgmental decomposition 
As indicated earlier, judgmental forecasts may be subject to cognitive biases Decomposition of the 
forecasting task into smaller and hence easier judgmental tasks, it is argued, should improve the 
quality of any estimates elicited, including probabilities [28]. For example, the greater ease with 
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which the component tasks can be carried out may reduce reliance on over-simplifying heuristics 
and hence reduce the effect of their associated biases.  
 
Decomposition, using event trees or fault trees [29] may be particularly helpful when probabilities of 
very rare events have to be estimated. Availability bias, caused for example by the reporting of 
unusual events in the media,  may lead to the probabilities of very rare events being over estimated 
while people may also have difficulty in distinguishing  between probabilities like  0.00001 and  
0.0000001  [3]. In these circumstances, an event tree could be formulated to depict the combinations 
of events which might foreshadow a rare event. The tree would then allow probability estimates to 
be made for these precursor events, rather than the rare event itself.  Many of these events may be 
relatively frequent and be associated with large reference classes so that statistical methods could be 
used to estimate their probabilities.  These probabilities can then be multiplied to establish the 
estimated probability of the rare event.  
 
Decomposition has other potential advantages. In decision analysis, for example, the separation of 
the probability estimation tasks from the consideration of the attractiveness of outcomes, may reduce 
the effects of wishful thinking or optimism bias. In addition, the process of explicit quantification 
„forces participants to express their assumptions and beliefs, thereby making them transparent and 
subject to challenge and improvement‟ [30].  It also can act as an antidote to groupthink  [31] where 
risks are ignored or underplayed by groups of decision makers. By forcing explicit consideration of 
the possibilities, decomposition may help to bring hitherto unrecognised opportunities or threats to 
the surface so that appropriate and timely action can be taken. 
 
However, decomposition is not a panacea for the elicitation of judgmental forecasts. The events for 
to which the decomposition is being applied may depend on a restricted or inappropriate decision 
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frame.  As a result the wrong problem may be addressed and probability assessments may not be 
carried out for events which represent fundamental changes from the status quo and which can have 
major impacts in the future. Moreover, the structure of the decomposition is likely to depend on 
particular beliefs about what constitutes the casual chain of events.  In addition, there may be 
problems in motivating forecasters to engage in decomposition because it involves an explicit 
exposure of one‟s assumptions, which may then be subject to challenge, while, if the decomposition 
is detailed it can involve considerable time and effort.  Motivation is likely to be particularly 
adversely affected where the decomposition method is unfamiliar to the person making the forecast 
or there is scepticism about the technique that is being used to implement it [28]. 
 
iv) Structured analogies 
Another approach to improving judgmental forecasts involves drawing the forecaster‟s attention to 
what is available in the reference class by highlighting the role of analogies. Without this support 
people may rely informally on their ability to remember similar cases so availability bias may result 
from a propensity to recall recent or unusual cases. When the use of judgment is appropriate it is 
likely that the membership of the reference class will be small. Because of this some researchers 
have proposed approaches that allow access to the reference class to be structured so that improved 
inferences can be drawn from it despite its sparsity.  For example, Lee et al [32] investigated ways of 
improving judgmental estimates of the effect of future sales promotions by providing a database of 
past promotions and deploying an algorithm which displayed the promotions that were most similar 
to the forthcoming promotion, together with their estimated effects on demand. Obtaining a useful 
number of analogies necessarily involved selecting  past promotions which differed to some extent 
from the target promotion (e.g. in their timing, type or sales region) so Lee et al.‟s forecasting 
support system also provided a simple facility that  allowed the user to explore the likely effect of 
these differences. This helped them to estimate the size of adaptations they needed to make to the 
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promotion effects of the selected cases when making their forecasts. The structured use of analogies 
has also been investigated in the context of conflict forecasting by Green and Armstrong [33]. Here, 
experts were asked to recall conflicts that were similar to the target case, to state the outcome of 
these conflicts and to rate their degree of similarity with the target. An administrator then combined 
this information to produce a forecast. In both of these studies the structured approach to the use of 
reference class information led to significant improvements in forecast accuracy.  
 
However, in the case of rare events, there is a danger that this emphasis on past analogies may 
distract the forecaster‟s attention away from the possibility of events which are not within the 
existing reference class, particularly rare and extreme events – a situation which is highly likely 
when membership of the reference class is sparse.  Also, the selection of similar events through 
either algorithms or expert judgment also may be predicated on a particular view of causality (e.g. 
that the effects of sales promotions are dependent on the characteristics that have been selected for 
storage in a database or that conflicts that are judged to be similar on a set of characteristics will  be 
resolved in the same way because of these characteristics). 
 
v) Statistical forecasting with judgmental intervention or adjustment 
Some systems manifest regular behaviour that is occasionally disturbed by the effects of foreseeable 
special events. For example, a time series of the demand for a product may exhibit regular seasonal 
patterns, which are disturbed when the product is promoted or subject to a change in taxation. In this 
situation statistical methods are likely to provide well calibrated forecasts during normal periods. 
However, the effects  of the special events (these are sometimes referred to as “broken leg” cues) 
may be relatively unpredictable.  When these events are infrequent or unique, the absence of a large 
reference class of similar events will preclude the effective use of statistical methods. In these cases 
forecasters may apply their judgment to estimate the effects of the special event.  
 21 
 
21 
 
In companies, managers commonly adjust statistical baseline forecasts to take the effect of special 
events into account, while economists often apply judgment to the components of econometric 
models [34, 35]. Laboratory and real world studies have demonstrated that such adjustments 
typically improve the accuracy of the baseline forecasts [36, 37].  There is, however, mixed evidence 
that they can compensate for situations when an inappropriate statistical model has been applied to 
the data [38, 39].  Moreover, research also suggests that there is much scope for enhancing 
predictability in these situations. First, decisions on when to intervene are often poor with a tendency 
towards over intervention as people falsely see special cases in random movements in the graph or 
are motivated to adjust forecasts to reinforce a sense of ownership of the forecasting process [36, 
40].  Second, estimates of the size of the required adjustment  are subject to cognitive biases. As a 
result, they often poorly calibrated with the outcomes of the special events. Clearly, the 
decomposition and structured analogies approaches outlined in the last section may be effective in 
improving judgmental adjustments as well as forecasts that are wholly based on judgment. 
 
vi) Delphi 
Judgement, alone, is used in the Delphi procedure where multiple individuals are initially required to 
give separate numerical judgements or forecasts – often years into the future and often for high-
impact events. These forecasts are, likely to be revised in the light of feedback provided  
anonymously by other members of the Delphi panel, over a number of subsequent „rounds‟ or 
iterations.  Response stability found across panellists, is the signal to cease additional iterations and 
take the average of the final round as the Delphi yield.  
 
Delphi‟s effectiveness over comparative procedures, at least in terms of judgemental accuracy, has 
generally been demonstrated.   In a review of empirical studies of Delphi, Rowe and Wright 
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[41]found that Delphi groups outperformed „statistical‟ groups (which involve the aggregation of the 
judgements of non-interacting individuals) in twelve studies, underperformed these in two, and „tied‟ 
in two others, while Delphi outperformed standard interacting groups in five studies, 
underperformed in one, and „tied‟ in two.  This trend is all the more impressive given that many 
laboratory studies of Delphi effectiveness have used simplified versions of the technique (e.g. with 
limited feedback) in simplified contexts (e.g. using non-expert, student subjects) that might be 
anticipated to undermine the virtues of the technique. 
 
Although research suggests that Delphi allows improved judgement compared to alternative 
methods, as demonstrated in these „technique comparison‟ studies, the reasons for this are still 
unclear, given relative dearth of „process‟ studies that have attempted to establish the precise 
mechanism for improvement in Delphi.  Generally, it is assumed that Delphi improves judgemental 
accuracy because of the feedback provided between rounds – in conjunction with the panellists‟ 
anonymity.   Rowe and Wright [42] compared three feedback conditions: an „Iteration‟ condition 
over rounds without feedback from the members of the Delphi panel), a „Statistical‟ feedback 
condition (involving median values and range of estimates), and a „Reasons‟ feedback condition 
(involving reasons from the Delphi panellists along with their numerical estimates).   They found 
that, although subjects were less inclined to change their forecasts as a result of receiving Reasons 
feedback than other types, when they did change forecasts, this change tended to be for the better, 
leading to a reduction in error.   Although subjects tended to make greater changes to their forecasts 
in the Iteration and Statistical conditions than in the Reasons condition, these changes did not, in 
general, improve predictions.  
 
As such, there is indicative evidence that the receipt of reasons why a particular numerical forecast is 
being advocated by a panel member is a useful source of information that can be used to improve 
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other panelists‟ predictions.   However, note that the focus of the Delphi procedure is on the 
prediction of single target variables such as the date of occurrence of a future event or a point 
estimate of an uncertain future quantity. Delphi is a well utilised procedure and most applications 
focus on forecasts of a 20 – 25 year horizon.   The exchange of reasons between panellists can, in 
principle, alert panellists to inappropriate framings, biases in the recall of similar cases, utilisation of 
inappropriate reference classes, cognitive bias, and inappropriate views of causality underpinning the 
unfolding of event chains. However, much depends on the degree of communication of the reasoning 
processes underpinning a particular panellists‟ prediction. In most Delphi applications, many 
predictions are sought from expert panellists and so, in practice, exchange of elaborated reasons may 
be attenuated. Also, exchange of reasons has not, to date, been a priority in practice – most 
applications of Delphi have involved the exchange of numerical estimates only. 
 
vii) Prediction markets 
Prediction markets offer an alternative method of obtaining estimates from groups. Participants  
trade contracts which typically stipulate that their owner will receive a sum of money (say $1) if a 
particular event occurs and nothing otherwise. The current price of the contract is taken to be the 
participants‟  aggregate view of the probability that the event will occur. Certain theoretical 
conditions have to be met for this to be the case. (e.g that traders are risk averse and their beliefs are 
independently normally distributed around the true value [43, 44])   However, the reliability of the 
approach may be robust to departures from these assumptions and empirical studies of the 
performance of a diverse range of markets indicate that they do yield accurate results [45]. 
Prediction markets offer the advantage that they rapidly respond to the latest information so that 
which may reduced the danger of  heavy dependence on out-of-date members of the reference class 
Also the aggregation of individual estimates may counter the cognitive biases of individual 
forecasters.  
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Nevertheless many of the reports of accurate  forecasts obtained from prediction  markets relate to 
circumstances  where there was a  relatively small set of  possible outcomes (e.g. outcomes of 
research and development projects, winners of  Presidential elections, successes of new products 
which films will be box-office successes, Oscar winners and outcomes of sports events).  There is 
less evidence about their success in  producing well calibrated probabilities for rare events.  Indeed, 
there would have to be some awareness of the possibility of such an event in the first place in order 
for a contract relating to it to be formulated in the first place. Moreover,  the  high level of stock 
markets‟ prices before  the credit crunch of 2008 suggests that  markets may not be good predictors 
of such events. The  majority of participants in a market may be influenced by predominant views 
about causality presented by the mass media. In addition, when anonymous reasons underlying 
judgments are exchanged in a Delphi process, people have an opportunity to learn and hence 
improve their estimates. In prediction markets no such information is shared so there are no 
opportunities to challenge the  potential frame blindness of individual participants. 
 
viii) Scenario planning 
The practice of scenario planning implicitly accepts that managers are not able to make valid 
assessments of the likelihood of unique future events and that „best guesses‟ of what the future may 
hold may be wrong. This view is in harmony with Gerd Gigerenzer‟s argument that probability 
theory does not apply to single events. Advocates of scenario planning also argue that it can counter 
groupthink by allowing minority opinions about the future to have „airtime‟, relative to majority 
opinion. 
 
How do scenarios achieve this? The first point to note is that a scenario is not a forecast of the 
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future. Multiple scenarios are pen-pictures of a range of plausible futures. Each individual scenario 
has an infinitesimal probability of actual occurrence but the range of a set of individual scenarios 
can be constructed in such a way as to bound the uncertainties that are seen to be inherent in the 
future – like the edges on the boundaries surrounding a multi-dimensional space. 
 
Scenarios focus on key uncertainties and certainties about the future and use this information to 
construct pen-pictures in an information-rich way in order to provide vivid descriptions of future 
worlds. By contrast, subjective probabilities entered into a decision tree provide numerical values 
that can be used in an expected utility calculation. The judgment process that produced such 
numbers is often not verbalized or recorded. When individuals disagree about their subjective 
probabilities for a critical event, then decision analysis practice is often to take an average, or 
weighted average, rather than to explore, in detail, the reasoning processes underlying individuals‟ 
assessments. Inherent in such analysis is the assumption that it is useful and possible to attempt to 
predict the future, whereas scenario planning assumes that the best that can be done is to identify 
critical future uncertainties and plan for the range of futures that could, plausibly, unfold. 
Essentially, scenarios highlight the causal reasoning underlying judgments about the future and give 
explicit attention to sources of uncertainty without trying to turn an uncertainty into a probability. A 
major focus is how the future can evolve from today‟s point-in-time to the future that has unfolded 
in the horizon year of the scenario – say 10 years hence. The relationship between the critical 
uncertainties (as they resolve themselves – one way or the other), important predetermined trends 
(such as demographics, e.g. the proportion of the US population who are in various age bands in, 
say, 10 years‟ time) and the behavior of actors who have a stake in the particular future (and who 
will tend to act to preserve and enhance their own interests within that future) are thought through in 
the process of scenario planning such that the resultant pen-pictures are, in fact, seen as plausible to 
those who have constructed the scenarios. 
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Figure 1 gives two examples of such causal analysis using data from a recent intervention, conducted 
by one of the authors, in a major EU bank involved in residential mortgage lending. The scenario 
method used was the “intuitive logics“ approach – see [46, 47] for more detail. The two clusters 
which were viewed by workshop participants to be both (i) of the highest uncertainty and (ii) the 
highest impact on the bank‟s operations are illustrated. 
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Figure 1: Two high impact, high uncertainty clusters 
 
 
Note that, in general, the two clusters that result from application of the intuitive logics approach to 
scenario construction will each contain a mix of pre-determined elements and critical uncertainties 
that are causally linked together. The four scenarios that are constructed at the next step are derived 
from the resolution of events within each cluster into two major outcomes - with each of the two 
outcomes of the first cluster then being combined with each of the two outcomes of the second 
cluster (see [46], chapter 7, for more detail). Thus, resolution of the contents of the two high-impact, 
high-uncertainty, clusters drive the development of the storylines of the four resultant scenarios. The 
development of the four storylines will, in practice, also utilise other uncertainties and pre-
determined elements that have been generated by scenario workshop participants but which are seen, 
by these participants, to have less impact on the focal issue of concern. of actual occurrence. 
 
Note that scenario planning is a practitioner-derived approach to dealing with uncertainty in decision 
making. It is not based on an axiom system – as is decision analysis – and so different practitioners 
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tend to promote different methodologies to construct scenarios. As we have seen, scenario thinking 
emphasizes the construction of causal „storylines‟ that describe how the future will unfold.  Such a 
way of anticipating the future seems to be quite natural. For example, Willem Wagenaar
   
in a study 
of how judges reach decisions in courtrooms has found, analogously, that judges and juries do not 
weigh probabilities that a defendant is guilty „beyond reasonable doubt‟. Instead, such decision 
makers evaluate scenarios that describe why and how the accused committed the crime. One such 
scenario is, in principle, contained in the prosecution‟s indictment. The prosecution tells the story of 
what happened and the court decides whether that is a true story or not. „Good‟ stories provide a 
context that gives an easy and natural explanation of why the „actors‟ behaved in the way they did. 
So, storytelling via scenario planning may be a natural way of making sense of the world. Because 
of its focus on causality, scenario planning is intuitively more attractive to managers and the take-up 
of scenario planning has been extensive compared to decision analysis – see [47]. Within a scenario 
planning workshop, decision makers experience and acknowledge the continuing fluidity of an 
emerging decision context. Scenario planning does not evaluate options against uncertainties in a 
single process of analysis. Instead, once the range of plausible futures has been defined, these futures 
can be utilized over an extended time period as and when new decision options are developed and 
subsequently tested in the „windtunnel‟ conditions. 
 
However, scenario planning is not without problems in aiding the anticipation of rare, high-impact 
events. Availability bias can enter scenarios, such that recent and current media-emphasised 
concerns (e.g. of financial downturns)  replicate themselves in to-be constructed scenarios. These 
practice-recognised issues have been labeled as as “future myopia”.  By contrast, as Wright et al [48] 
note, one way, used in practice by scenario practitioners, is to provide challenge to the decision 
makers‟ mental models by the introduction of   “remarkable people” into the strategic conversation – 
i.e., by including, as participants, in a scenario exercise those individuals (often from outside the host 
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organization) who hold disparate and contradictory views on key uncertainties.   In the scenario 
intervention conducted by the authors with a EU bank‟s residential mortgage business, described 
earlier, the participant directors evidenced no recognition of factors that could lead to the – then just 
months away – sub-prime meltdown in the US and its subsequent impact on the UK housing market.  
In fact, at the time of our scenario intervention the bank was considering increasing its sub-prime 
exposure! Whether or not the inclusion of “remarkable people “in, what was, a purely internal 
scenario planning exercise would have placed the sub-prime meltdown on the scenario agenda is 
unknown. Scenario planning practitioners argue that between-workshop activity spent on 
researching the nature of critical uncertainties identified in earlier workshops will also add to the 
quality of a strategic conversation about the nature of the future - but empirical evidence on the 
benefit of such desk-based research has also not been conducted. 
 
Interestingly, only one extant study has provided an investigation of the impact of the use of scenario 
planning on subsequent and contemporaneous corporate performance [49].   In that study, the 
authors measured the degree of use of scenario planning in both water industry firms and IT 
consulting firms.   However, the achieved questionnaire returns from the firms in these industries 
was low (22 water and 25 IT) and so, in our view, even indicative conclusions cannot be drawn.  
Clearly, as yet, the benefits of scenario planning on an organizational performance have not been 
empirically demonstrated. 
 
Can the anticipation of rare events be improved? 
Protective strategies 
The above discussion reveals that all of the extant methods contain weaknesses. Of particular 
concern are those possible high-impact events that are implicitly assigned a probability of zero. As 
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such, decision makers using any or all of these methods will still be susceptible to surprises that may 
have severely negative consequences or represent huge missed opportunities.  Makridakis and Taleb 
[50] argue that we should accept that accurate predictions of the occurrence of rare, high-impact 
events are not possible and so should adopt protective strategies – such as hedging by use of 
financial “covered puts”.  They argue that we should buy insurance to limit the downside of 
negatively-valenced events (such as a huge loss of a major industrial plant) but allow the unlimited 
upside of  positively-valenced events (such as a possible huge gain by investing a small amount in a 
speculative venture). Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba [1] argue that business strategies should be 
built to the same analogous standard as buildings that are designed to withstand low-probability, but 
high-impact, earthquakes. Taleb [51] argues for redundancy in financial investment by retaining 
“idle” capital – so-called de-leveraging. He notes that human beings have some duplicate organs and 
also some organs can take on new functions – so-called degeneracy. Thus, maximising redundancy, 
although increasing costs and restricting the possibility of leveraging resources, enables survival in 
difficult times.   In a similar vein, Wright and Goodwin [2] argued that the decision maker should be 
alert to the degree to which any major strategic option is: (i) flexible – i.e., investment can be up-
scaled or down-scaled at any point in the future; (ii) diversified – i.e., following the option that 
diversifies the firm‟s current major offering(s)  by providing either a different technology base, a 
different production base, or a different customer base;  (iii) insurable. This prescription can be 
implemented as a necessary check-list that must be completed in any option evaluation or as part of 
a more formalised, multi-attribute, evaluation of options against scenarios [52]. 
 
Attempting to  prepare  for all possible high-impact events 
An alternative to having strategies to provide protection against unknown events which are assumed 
to be completely unpredictable is to try to identify all possible high impact events that might occur  
and make contingency plans to deal with them For example, in the sphere of crisis management, 
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Pearson et al [53] noted that many organizations prepare for the crisis that they believe most 
probable or will have most impact if it occurs. These authors argue that , instead,  “… the best-
prepared organizations compile a crisis portfolio for an assortment of crises that would demand 
different responses… this may seem a wasteful approach but… the most dangerous crises… cause 
greater trouble, specifically because no-one  was thinking about or preparing for them” (p 55).  
However, the cost-benefit trade-off of preparing an organization for all possible crises is not 
addressed in the extant literature. Nor is a systematic approach offered to enable managers to rank-
order crises for differential attention. 
Widening the range of possible scenarios 
In the sphere of scenario planning, Wright and Goodwin [2] argued for an enhancement of the 
scenario planning process by creating a range of more extreme scenarios than those that result from 
use of the intuitive logics scenario development methodology, described earlier.  Wright and 
Goodwin argued that scenarios should encompass a wider range of uncertainties in order to 
anticipate rare high-impact events. For example, a conventional range of scenarios for the UK 
economy may contain GDP growth figures ranging from -2% to +5%. But how secure can decision 
makers be that this represents the complete range of possibilities? Rather than moving forward 
through causal chains to arrive at scenarios, as in conventional, intuitive logics, scenario planning, 
Wright and Goodwin‟s alternative is to work backwards from an organization‟s objectives. Here, the 
ranges of possible achievement (worst possible and best possible case) for each of the main 
objectives can be extended (i.e., made more extreme) and decision makers can be asked whether 
there they can envisage particular interactions of pre-cursor events that make these, more extreme, 
best- and worst-case levels of achievement plausible. Note the word “plausible” - plausibility implies 
that the causal events underpinning a major scenario outcome can be articulated. As such, outcomes 
such as “GDP growth of 3000%” would not be deemed plausible and so would not be part of any set 
of such extreme scenarios. In a similar vein to Wright and Goodwin‟s backward logic scenario 
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method, Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba [1] argue that strategic thinkers should create a “virtual 
time-machine” and imagine that rare, high-impact, events have, in fact, happened. Next the 
strategists should attempt to think-through their causation. In short, methods for widening the range 
of constructed scenarios are now under development but, of course, the resultant scenarios may still 
not contain the particular rare events that actually occur. This is especially true if the causal 
unfolding of these events is, a-priori, opaque to scenario workshop participants.  
 
Practical proposals for enhancing Delphi and scenario planning by incorporating devil’s advocacy 
and dialectical inquiry  
Schweiger, Sandberg and Ragan [54] observe that discussion and other interaction amongst top 
executives are the common ways in which information is shared and evaluated. But groups of 
decision makers often smooth over conflict and the social pressure for social harmony amongst 
individual group members is strong – such that group members become more concerned with 
retaining the approval of fellow members than coming up with good solutions to the task in hand.  
As Janis [55] noted, in discussing his concept of groupthink, these processes can lead to the 
suppression of ideas that are critical of the decision on which the majority of a group is converging 
and, as such, there can be a failure to examine the risks of preferred decisions, a failure to re-appraise 
initially–rejected alternatives, a failure to work out contingency plans, and an increasing feeling of 
invulnerability in the group‟s decision. As a remedy, Janis argued that  the leader should  (i) 
withhold his own opinion - since in hierarchical organizations subordinates will also tend not to 
criticise opinions proffered by those who are higher up the hierarchy, (ii) encourage new ideas and 
criticisms, (iii) make sure that the group listens to minority views , and (iv) use processes designed 
to delay forming an early consensus.  
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Of the methods that we have reviewed to aid the anticipation of rare, high-impact events, only 
Delphi and scenario planning provide some degree of argument-based challenge to thinking. As we 
have seen, Delphi does this by the anonymous dialectical exchange of arguments for particular 
points of view. By contrast, scenario planning does this by engaging a process whereby detailed 
causal  stories for alternative plausible futures are constructed. But as we argued and demonstrated,  
conventional scenario planning may,  in fact, replicate and  reinforce  existing frames of the future 
unless “remarkable people” are employed to challenge these framings. Groups tend to share 
information that the individuals have in common and the probability that a piece of information is 
shared in group discussion has been found to be proportional to the number of people aware of it 
[56].  
 
In the decision making literature, rather than the forecasting literature, alternative group-based 
methods for improving decision making have been proposed and tested. We describe these 
approaches next and then re-formulate these approaches to aid the anticipation of rare events. 
Schweiger et al [57] discuss alternative approaches to engender debate and evaluation of decisions in 
management teams. They differentiate (i) dialectical inquiry and (ii) devil‟s advocacy. Both methods 
systematically introduce conflict and debate by using sub-groups who role-play. In dialectical 
inquiry, the subgroups develop opposing alternatives and then come together to debate their 
assumptions and recommendations. In devil‟s advocacy, one subgroup offers a proposal, while the 
other plays devil‟s advocate, critically probing all elements and recommendations in the proposal. 
Both methods encourage groups to generate alternative courses of action and minimise tendencies 
towards premature agreement or convergence on a single alternative. Both methods also lead to a 
more critical evaluation of assumptions by providing mechanisms for encouraging dissent whilst at 
the same time fostering a high-level of understanding of the final group decision. Nevertheless, these 
role-played, conflict-enhancing, interventions for improving decision making need to be focussed on 
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factual information because personalities can, inappropriately, become the focus of discussion. 
Advocates of the techniques argue that they are most-suited to ill-structured non-routine decisions.  
An empirical study [57] compared both techniques to a non-adversarial approach where decisions 
were simply discussed with the aim of achieving a consensus amongst group members.  
Questionnaire ratings by group participants found that the two conflict-based approaches were rated 
higher in terms of producing better recommendations and better questioning of assumptions.  
Formalizing and legitimizing conflict can thus enhance perceptions of the quality of the outcome of 
group decision making. However, whilst conflict can improve perceived decision quality, it may 
weaken the ability of the group to work together in the future if the role-playing is not sensitively 
managed.  Also, as Nemeth, Brown and Rogers [58] document, authentic minority dissent, when 
correctly managed, is superior to role-playing interventions in stimulating a greater search for 
information on all sides of an issue. But, generally the authentic dissenter is disliked even when 
she/he has been shown to stimulate better thought processes. However, other research has shown that 
the persistent authentic dissenter, while not liked, can be admired and respected [59]. Also, of course 
implementation of decisions rests on securing the subsequent cooperation of involved parties and so 
affective personal criticism invoked in the prior critical debate will be dysfunctional [60]. 
 
Yaniv [61] demonstrated the power of role-playing in a laboratory-based study of  a framing 
problem. Here, participants were divided into two groups whose members were psychologically 
primed with either (i) one or the other of two perspectives  on the problem – the heterogeneous 
condition , or (ii)  the same perspective on a decision  problem – the homogeneous condition. Each 
of the two groups then convened to discuss the decision problem and come to a group decision. The 
results were compelling – the homogeneous grouping revealed a stronger framing effect than the 
heterogeneous grouping. This minimal manipulation produced a discernable impact on subsequent 
decision quality. Yaniv concluded that Delphi applications could actively create such heterogeneity 
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by assigning roles to panellists as they make their individual forecasts – such as conservative, 
pessimistic, or optimistic. Additionally, by our analysis, the roles assigned could include those of  an 
agent provocateur  - who provides distinctly different forecasts from  those of other panelists and 
includes  a critique of other transmitted  rationales within his own  accompanying rationale for the 
forecast - before it is transmitted anonymously to other panelists. 
 
In scenario planning, sometimes scenario development involves a scenario team composed of 
representatives from multiple agencies. Cairns et al [62] have argued that the process of scenario 
planning can provide a non-adversarial, common viewpoint to unite, what may be, fragmented 
groupings. By contrast, in terms of our analysis, the fragmentation should instead be conserved – at 
least until the point when any action response to the constructed set of scenarios is debated. In more 
usual scenario development conducted within a single organization, the conventional process results 
in the initial development of four skeleton scenarios that are then each fleshed-out by one of four 
sub-groups.  On our analysis, once a particular scenario is fully developed it should then be 
subjected to adversarial critique by one or more of the other subgroups. Such a process could also be 
extended to provide adversarial critiques of the more extreme scenarios whose construction we 
described earlier in this section. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we reviewed methodologies that aim to aid anticipation of rare, high-impact, events. 
We examined predictability from the perspective of forecasters‟ ability to obtain well-calibrated 
probabilities or point forecasts for events and identified six factors that can lead to poor calibration 
and hence low predictability. We then examined how successful a range of existing methods are in 
mitigating these factors, including the use of expert judgment, statistical forecasting, Delphi, 
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prediction markets and scenario planning. We demonstrated that all the extant methods, including 
combinations of methods, contain weaknesses and that anticipation of rare, high-impact, events can 
only be achieved by judgmental heuristics that, likely, entail bias. We conclude that the only 
remedies are to either (i) provide protection for the organization against the occurrence of 
negatively-valenced events whilst allowing the organization to benefit from the occurrence of 
positively-valenced events - such protection can involve the creation of redundancy, flexibility, and 
diversity in an organization‟s operations and resources, or (ii) provide conditions to challenge one‟s 
own thinking – and hence improve anticipation. We outlined how use of components of devil‟s 
advocacy and dialectical inquiry can be combined with Delphi and scenario planning to enhance 
anticipation of rare events. 
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